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Abstract 
Since 2011, the United States has experienced a resurgence in state-level right-to-work 
laws. The causes of this trend, however, have remained unexplored by social science 
literature. In this paper, I examine the introduction and passage of bills among state 
legislatures and test the respective explanatory power of demographics, partisanship, 
union membership, small business prevalence, and joblessness. After applying regression 
models to introduction and passage models respectively, I find evidence that GOP 
legislative control holds a positive association with the passage of right-to-work laws, 
while union strength holds a negative association with the passage of right-to-work laws. 
In addition, only presence of a GOP governor holds a negative, statistically significant 
relationship the introduction of right-to-work bills. Moreover, while the introduction of 
RTW bills may often be a tool of opposing a non-GOP governorship, I conclude that 
GOP political strategy serves as the most compelling factor in explaining the resurging 
passage of right-to-work laws. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
On December 11, 2012, Governor Rick Snyder signed Senate Bill No. 116, 
eliminating an employer’s ability to require the payment of union dues as a condition of 
employment.1 All major U.S. news outlets, and even some international syndicates, 
reported the bill’s passage, as well as the protestors and riot police stationed outside the 
Michigan state capitol building in Lansing. To many, the scenes were accompanied by 
the realization that the home of the United Automobile Workers and American 
automotive industry had rebuffed the demands of organized labor. Across the political 
spectrum, many agreed that Michigan, and the United States, would not be the same. 
 Governor Snyder’s signature marked the beginning of a resurgence in right-to-
work legislation. Right-to-work laws prohibit the establishment of union-security 
agreements, a contract resulting from collective bargaining negotiations between 
employers and unions. These contracts stipulate that all employees must become union 
members and begin paying union dues within 30 days of being hired.2 Security 
agreements also allow for ‘core’ union members, which allows some employees to pay 
dues only directly used for representation in collective bargaining and contract 
negotiations. Unions are obligated to inform all employees of this option.3 
In the course of U.S. history, 28 states have passed right-to-work (RTW) laws 
(National Conference of State Legislatures).4 Before Michigan’s passage, 22 states 
passed right-to-work laws: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, 
                                                     
1 Hartfield, Elizabeth. “Michigan Governor Signs Right-to-Work into Law.” ABC News. December 11, 
2012. http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/michigan-governor-signs-work-bill-law/story?id=17934332 
2 National Labor Relations Board. “Frequently Asked Questions – NLRB.” 2018. 
https://www.nlrb.gov/resources/faq/nlrb 
3 Ibid. 
4 Non-state U.S. territories and districts are not included in this analysis. However, I note that employees of 
the US federal government, as well as those in the territory of Guam, operate under right-to-work laws. 
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Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, 
Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and 
Wyoming (National Conference of State Legislatures). These initial passages occurred 
largely in the West and South. I explore literature examining these different cases later. In 
the six years after passage in Michigan, the following five other states passed 
comprehensive right-to-work legislation: Indiana, Kentucky, Wisconsin, Missouri, and 
West Virginia (National Conference of State Legislatures). Figure 1 displays this 
visually. 
Figure 1: Map of RTW Passages 
 
 
Baehren 8 
 
 Most notable in this timeline is the recent resurgence of RTW law passage. Figure 
1 depicts a histogram of state RTW passage frequency over the course of a 70-year 
period. 
Figure 2: State RTW Passage By Year 
 
The highest concentration of RTW law passage occurs in the late 1940s and early 1950s. 
After that point, the frequency of RTW laws decreases significantly. A resurgence, 
however, occurs within the last twenty years. 
 In this thesis, I seek to determine the factors leading to this resurgence. To clarify, 
this thesis does not attempt to examine the determinants of all RTW laws in U.S. history. 
Several previous studies have explored this question. None add post-2011 RTW law 
passages in their analyses. This thesis does not simply add these recent observations to 
previous analyses because RTW laws passed in the past twenty years may operate under 
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different determinant factors than those of the 1940s and 1950s. Kaminski (2015) 
identifies this as a plausible assumption due to the apparent stronger role of partisanship 
in Michigan’s RTW passage compared to RTW passages in the South. Moreover, the 
question of this thesis is as follows: among the remaining non-RTW states, what factors 
play a significant role in increasing or decreasing the likelihood of RTW passage? 
In Chapter 2, I describe previous literature focusing on RTW laws. During the 
first half of the review, I focus on previous research exploring the effects of right-to-work 
laws on a variety of economic and political indicators. During the latter half, I examine 
theories of determinants of RTW law passage, including those of demographics, 
joblessness, enterprise size, partisanship, and union density. From this analysis, I 
conclude that no rigorous quantitative analysis has been applied to the possible 
determinants of RTW laws passed in the previous six years. In addition, no previous 
analysis has utilized event history techniques.  
 In Chapter 3, I present data and methods utilized in this analysis. For the 
introduction of RTW legislation, I utilize a Poisson model due to the dependent variable’s 
classification as a count variable. For the passage of RTW legislation, I utilize a Cox 
regression model, a type of continuous survival model with a nonparametric survival 
function. In contrast to previous passage models, this addresses the issue of endogeneity 
in years following the passage of right-to-work.  
 In Chapter 4, I examine the results from applying each model to the different 
theories presented. For the introduction of RTW bills, I find some evidence that only the 
presence of a GOP governor, a portion of the partisanship theory, has a statistically 
significant relationship, wherein the presence of a non-GOP governor in a given state and 
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year is associated with a greater probability of RTW bill introduction. This falls in line 
with some theories explaining the introduction of bills, regardless of their likelihood of 
passing. For the passage of RTW laws, I find that only union density and GOP 
composition of the legislature have a statistically significant relationship with the passage 
of RTW laws within the survival framework. These relationships do not appear to be 
based on moving past a particular threshold within the ranges of these variables. Rather, 
higher levels of GOP composition are associated with a higher likelihood of states 
passing a RTW law. Likewise, union density follows a similar relationship. 
This generates a number of possible implications regarding the dynamics that lead 
to RTW passage. First, demographic changes or increased sensitivity to racial minorities 
among a portion of the population do not offer a compelling explanation of RTW 
passage. Second, labor market conditions within a given state and year also does not offer 
a compelling explanation of RTW passage. Third, statistically significant relationships 
related to union density and GOP legislative composition imply that RTW laws are, 
among the factors examined, primarily driven by political agenda and strategy.  
The relevance of thesis cannot be understated. Motivations underlying RTW 
passage resurgence have been documented in the past on an anecdotal basis, but no study 
has attempted to scrutinize these motivations through a rigorous statistical model. States 
that continue to exhibit decreasing union density and GOP domination within the 
legislature may be at greater risk of becoming right-to-work states. This then implies a 
risk of political and economic consequences that affect workers, businesses, and political 
organizations. Though, as established in previous literature, these effects may have 
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varying degrees of severity. Indeed, future research should examine new data and more 
precisely determine the dynamics leading to RTW passage. 
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Chapter 2: Literature and Theory Review 
This section details scholarly literature focusing on right-to-work legislation. This 
body of work can be divided into two categories: effects of right-to-work legislation and 
causes of right-to-work legislation. The former gives significance to the presence of 
right-to-work legislation on economic and political circumstances in a given state. The 
latter gives context to the subject and methods of this thesis. In summation, the economic 
and political consequences of right-to-work legislation have been established as 
significant. While multiple theories have been proposed and tested to explain emergence 
of these laws, the literature has not tested these theories in the post-2011 resurgence of 
these laws. In addition, several tests have failed to eliminate bias, and the mere 
introduction of RTW legislation has failed to be explored as an additional response 
variable. 
Effects of Right-to-Work Legislation  
Right-to-work laws prevent compulsory union membership for employees in a 
given profession. In employer-union negotiations, parties often agree that the employer in 
question may only hire union members, or cannot retain employees who fail to join a 
union in a given period of time. Unions and other parties have often advocated for 
allowance of these provisions by law in order to bolster union membership and, 
consequentially, maintain greater bargaining power in negotiations with employers.5 
Employers and other parties have often advocated for the prohibition of these provisions 
                                                     
5 National Labor Relations Board. “Frequently Asked Questions – NLRB.” 2018. 
https://www.nlrb.gov/resources/faq/nlrb 
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due to their perceived strengthening of union bargaining power and perceived reduction 
of flexibility in human resources practices.6 
 An extensive body of literature exists examining the economic and political 
effects of right-to-work laws at the state level. This review heavily references Moore and 
Newman (1985) and Moore and Newman (1998). Most studies have found that RTW 
laws have a negative, statistically significant effect on union membership (Warren and 
Strauss, 1979; Hirsch, 1980; Farber, 1983; Hunt and White, 1983; Carroll, 1983; Reder, 
1988; Fiorito, 1990; Eren and Ozbeklik, 2015). However, some notable exceptions have 
found no statistical significance (Koeller, 1985; Moore and Newman, 1975; Wessels, 
1981). In contrast, the literature on wages has largely found no effect on average wages 
(Moore, 1980; Wessels, 1981; Eren and Ozbeklik, 2015). Some notable exceptions find a 
statistically significant negative effect on average wages (Carroll, 1983; Roberts and 
Habans, 2015).  
Economists have also found that employment effects of RTW states to be largely 
negligible (Bennett and Johnson, 1980; Farber, 1983; Eren and Ozbeklik, 2015). 
Moreover, declining union density has led to the growth of precarious work, leading to 
increased long-term unemployment, non-standard work arrangements, economic 
inequality, and poor health among affected workers (Kalleberg, 2009). Further expanding 
this body were tests of the relocation hypothesis, wherein businesses tend to locate in 
RTW states. Some evidence indicates that businesses often relocate to RTW states from 
non-RTW states (Newman, 1984). In addition, RTW laws have been shown to increase 
productivity and population (Vedder, 2010; Hicks, LaFaive, and Devaraj, 2016). Some 
                                                     
6 National Labor Relations Board. “Frequently Asked Questions – NLRB.” 2018. 
https://www.nlrb.gov/resources/faq/nlrb 
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studies have contradicted this view by finding that highly-unionized industries show 
higher levels of productivity than others (Freeman and Medoff, 1983). 
 Insofar as effects categorized as political, extensive literature has been devoted to 
RTW effects on collective bargaining. Ellwood and Fine (1987) conduct a thorough 
analysis evaluating the effect of RTW laws on organizing success, wherein they attribute 
significant short-term reductions in union organizing success to RTW law passage across 
states. They also find similar declines in other union activities, such as success in 
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) elections. Some evidence also indicates that 
RTW laws dampen labor campaign contributions, decrease voter turnout, and lead to 
fewer working class candidates seeking and obtaining positions of elected office 
(Feigenbaum et al. 2017). Several studies also indicate an increase in free riding, wherein 
increasing numbers of non-union members depend upon unions for collective bargaining 
(Katz, 1983; Davis and Huston, 1993; Sobel, 1995; Pierce, 2016). These political effects 
are significant to the strength and survival of American labor movements.7 
Causes of Right-to-Work Legislation 
The literature surrounding the determinants of right-to-work laws is relatively 
sparse. The 1947 Taft-Hartley Act, which was a federal law allowing state-level right-to-
work legislation, is considered the genesis of modern right-to-work legislation (Feldacker 
1990). As a result, several states, largely in the South and West, successfully passed 
comprehensive right-to-work laws in the 1940s and 1950s, and a small number of 
additional passages in the following decades. Beyond this, different factors have been 
examined for their contribution to the emergence of right-to-work legislation and laws. 
                                                     
7 Eidelson, Josh. “Attacks on Labor Put Unions on the Defensive in Election 2012.” The Nation. November 
2, 2012. https://www.thenation.com/article/attacks-labor-put-unions-defensive-election-2012/ 
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For the following review of this literature, I draw heavily from the review by Jacobs and 
Dixon (2006) of different theories of RTW law emergence and each theory’s empirical 
viability. 
Innovation Theory 
 An innovation theoretical framework aids in forming the basis of RTW adoption. 
While previous studies have considered RTW specifically through an innovation 
framework, some previous work remains applicable. Gray (1973) explores different 
dimensions of how states decide to adopt particular legislation. After the genesis of an 
idea, some or all states consider whether to adopt it as law. A wave of first adopters 
typically begins the process of implementation and is followed by subsequent adopters. 
Gray draws several conclusions regarding the characteristics of early adopters, such as 
higher levels of wealth and resources; however, due to her examination of primarily 
expenditure-based laws, these conclusions may not be applicable to largely regulatory-
based RTW laws. Most important to note, however, is Gray’s conclusion that economic 
and political factors play a critical role in the “diffusion” of a policy idea. Moreover, 
following the genesis of an idea, political and economic factors determine which states 
adopt a given policy and in what order.  
Racial Demographic Theory 
Several studies have explored the relationship between racial demographics and 
collective bargaining legislation. Given the diversity of the modern American workplace, 
theories of racial motivation behind reductions in collective bargaining strength have 
been explored. Several explanations have been offered describing the underlying 
dynamics of these divisions on collective bargaining. Griffin and Korstad (1995) find that 
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racial divisions reduce the ability of unions to organize due to breakdowns in solidarity. 
Racial tensions between union members allows employers to divide members and better 
extract demands. Outside the internal dynamics of the union, racial demographics have 
been found to engender differing treatment of unions. Giles and Buckner (1993), as well 
as Giles and Hertz (1994), find that larger minority populations in a community increase 
the likelihood of legislation hostile to minorities. Specifically toward labor laws, Jacobs 
(1978) finds that states with the largest percentages of African Americans were more 
likely to have policies favoring collective bargaining. Thus, while African Americans 
often favor collective bargaining policies, states with large minority populations often 
maintain hostile policies toward minorities.  
Union Density 
Union strength often depends on the ability of unions to organize. The literature 
generally agrees that high union density has a negative impact on the passage of RTW 
laws (Tollefson and Pichler, 1974; Wessels, 1981; Nieswiadomy et al., 1991; Jacobs and 
Dixon, 2006). Private-sector union membership has declined substantially since the 
1980s (Farber and Western 2000; Hirsch et al. 2001). As a result, declining union 
strength may serve as a viable explanation for the resurgence in RTW law passage. Issues 
of reverse causality, however, have plagued the reliability of past estimates, and as a 
result, previous conclusions cannot be given a causal interpretation. In the years 
following the passage of a RTW law, the conditions determining repeal may be altered by 
the passage of that RTW law. For instance, a RTW law may reduce the ability of unions 
to organize repeal campaigns, which reduces the probability that repeal will occur. The 
literature on the effects of RTW laws supports the plausibility of this framework. The 
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exact difference in these pre- and post-passage conditions remains unclear because, with 
the exception of New Hampshire in 1949, no state has successfully repealed a RTW law. 
Enterprise Size 
Anecdotal evidence suggests high levels of small businesses as a portion of all 
businesses in a given state lead to greater likelihood of RTW passage. Previous literature 
suggests this conclusion on an empirical level as well. Hostility toward policies favoring 
labor unions is higher in areas with high levels of small enterprises (Reynolds et al., 
1991). Jacobs and Dixon (2006), however, theorize that, in the context of RTW laws, this 
relationship changes over time. Several studies have concluded that large firms exhibited 
less hostility toward pro-labor policies prior to the 1970s (Canak and Miller, 1990; 
Brueggermann and Brown, 2003). Following the 1970s, however, large firms generally 
showed less deference to labor unions. As a result, Jacobs and Dixon (2006) theorize that 
the negative relationship between state enterprise size composition and RTW law passage 
diminishes in magnitude over time, and ultimately find empirical support for this 
hypothesis. 
Partisanship 
In contrast to political ideology among the state population, partisanship focuses 
specifically on political parties. Generally, the Republican Party has supported pro-
management policies relatively to the Democratic Party (Freeman and Medoff, 1984; 
Greenstone, 1977). Furthermore, the political center in the United States has become 
more conservative since the 1980s (Hacker and Pierson, 2010; Mann and Ornstein, 
2016). Jacobs and Dixon (2006) conduct a rigorous analysis focuses on the GOP 
composition of state legislatures and GOP control of state governorships, but find no 
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effect of partisanship in the passage of RTW laws. These conclusions, however, could be 
less critical in evaluating recent passages due to the shifts in coalitions forming U.S. 
political parties in the last sixty years. 
Previous Statistical Models 
 The literature has established several approaches to empirical analysis of the 
determinants of RTW laws, and explored the advantages and disadvantages of each 
approach. “Stock models” are most often used, wherein researchers collect cross-
sectional or pooled state data over a number of years and measure this against an RTW 
outcome indicator variable (Moore and Newman, 1998). Two major issues result from 
the stock model. First, omitted-variable bias occurs when critical variables are not 
included in the model, or rather, explanatory variables highly correlated with one another 
cannot be distinguished. Second, if highly correlated control variables are included in 
these models, issues of multicollinearity result. “Fixed effect models” are also often used, 
but only Jacobs and Dixon (2006) have incorporated a similar effect (Moore and 
Newman, 1998).  
Introduction Literature 
 While little to no previous research explores the determinants of RTW bill 
introductions, several studies allow us to generally build a framework of why bills could 
be introduced in the legislature. While bill sponsorship has been subject to frequent 
study, bill introduction has been less so. Some recent studies, however, should be 
highlighted. Members of state legislatures introduce to thousands of pieces of legislation 
every session, but most do not transition into law (Krutz, 2005). Legislative rules and 
traditions play a significant role in the frequency of bill introduction (Cooper and Young, 
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1989). Nonetheless, bill introduction has been used as indicator of the “importance” of an 
issue to legislators and how much influence particular interests exercise among 
representatives (Flavin and Franko, 2016). Introductions often occur if legislators have 
constituents that largely subscribe to extreme beliefs on a particular issue, such as 
abortion (Highton and Rocca, 2005). Moreover, electoral considerations appear to play a 
significant role in the decision of legislators to introduce bills and stake particularly 
strong stance on an issue (Lazarus, 2013; Sulkin 2005). Surveyed constituents have often 
identified bill introduction as reason for liking a particular U.S. House incumbent (Box-
Steffensmeier et al., 2003). Moreover, we would expect legislative introduction 
frequency to correspond with the strength or influence of different constituent groups on 
state legislators. 
Literature Conclusions 
This review highlights several critical gaps in the literature surrounding the 
determinants of RTW laws. First, no rigorous empirical analysis has been undertaken 
examining the resurgence in RTW laws since 2012, whether independently or in the 
context of previous RTW measures. Second, previous analyses have often faced issues of 
bias due to the endogenous nature of explanatory variables. Moreover, further techniques 
can be undertaken to isolate causal relationships and remove bias in statistical models. 
Third, previous analyses have almost exclusively focused on the passage of RTW 
legislation. Several additional conclusions can be drawn through an exploration of the 
mere introduction of RTW bills in state legislatures. Fourth, previous analyses have failed 
to include fixed effects or other attempts to capture unobserved differences between 
states and years, resulting in omitted variable bias. Fifth, most analyses have included 
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control variables that resulted in multicollinearity, eliminating the ability to draw 
meaningful conclusions. Due to these five shortcomings in previous studies, this paper 
incorporates the emergence of RTW legislation since 2012, attempts to remove bias 
through a number of techniques unexplored by previous literature, and analyzes the 
introduction of RTW legislation since 2011 as an additional response variable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Baehren 21 
 
Chapter 3: Data and Methods 
The following empirical framework aims to test five primary theories explaining 
the emergence of right-to-work legislation. This section first explores three different 
response variables that operationalize the presence of right-to-work legislation. Then it 
explores the two models (passage and introduction) meant to test each theory, including 
indicator variables, controls, and their interaction. 
Response Variable: Presence of Right-to-Work Legislation 
The presence of right-to-work legislation, as well as changes in its presence, are 
measured through two separate but related variables. State-level legislative data is 
provided by the National Conference of State Legislatures’ Collective Bargaining and 
Labor Union Legislation Database, which was last updated by the organization on July 1, 
2016. For bill introductions, the database begins in 2011 and offers legislative data on all 
50 states, Washington, DC, and major U.S. territories. NCSL also includes a section 
identifying RTW passage years by state beginning in 1947.8 All legislation is either 
introduced, or both introduced and passed, meaning the law has been passed by a given 
state legislature and signed into law. First, passage of a comprehensive right-to-work law 
in a given year and state is represented by a binary variable, “RTW Passage” (0, 1). 
Second, the number of introduced right-to-work laws in a given year and state, whether 
comprehensive or partial, is presented by a count variable, “RTW Introduction”. Only 
legislation favoring RTW laws is included, while bills against RTW laws are excluded. 
                                                     
8 NCSL also identifies years in which RTW state constitutional amendments were passed. These, however, 
are excluded from this analysis, unless a RTW constitutional amendment represents the sole passage of 
RTW legislation. 
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Each of these variables measures the presence of right-to-work legislation in 
distinctive ways. Binary passage/not passage measures what is commonly referred to as a 
right-to-work law, wherein compulsory membership in or payment of dues to any union 
is prohibited. This representation, however, fails to operationalize other dimensions of 
right-to-work legislation. Introduction of legislation can indicate overall willingness of 
legislatures to consider right-to-work legislation of varying comprehensiveness, which is 
not captured by the mere passage of legislation. This justifies the inclusion of a count 
variable measuring the introduction of legislation. Further interpretations of introductions 
will be explained in later sections. 
Explanatory Variables 
 Each theory proposed by the literature requires a different explanatory variable 
for operationalization. While I have applied some precedents directly from the literature, 
others have been designed differently in order to build a more consistent and less bias 
model. 
 Demographics 
 The literature has established a possible relationship between racial demographics 
and the passage of RTW laws. In order to operationalize racial composition of a 
state, I will use the number of black residents as a proportion of total resident 
population in each given year and state. These are provided by Current Population 
Estimates by the U.S. Census. Given precedent in the literature and the role of this 
group as the largest minorities in the United States, this variable should 
operationalize the racial diversity of different U.S. states. 
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 Partisanship 
 The literature has proposed, but not firmly established a relationship between 
partisanship of the state government and the passage of RTW laws. In order to 
operationalize partisanship of the state government, I will use two variables: GOP 
composition of the state legislature and presence of GOP governor. For 
convenience, if a state maintains a bicameral system, I will combine the two 
bodies. Only 49 states will be utilized in this analysis.9 The relationship between 
the legislature and the governor will be operationalized with the inclusion of an 
interaction term. 
 Enterprise Size 
The literature has explored a relationship between enterprise size composition and 
the passage of RTW laws. In order to operationalize enterprise size composition 
of a state, I will use the number of small businesses (less than 100 employees) as 
a proportion of the total number of businesses in each given year and state. These 
estimates are provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). Given its measure 
of the presence of small businesses in a given state and year, this measure should 
approximate enterprise size composition (Jacobs and Dixon 2006). 
Joblessness 
The literature has also explored relationship between joblessness and the passage 
of RTW laws. In order to operationalize joblessness, I will use the unemployment 
rate for a given state and year. These estimates are provided by the BLS as well. 
                                                     
9 Nebraska has been excluded due to its unicameral, nonpartisan legislature. 
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Given its measure of unemployment, this measure should accurately approximate 
the joblessness in a given state. 
Union Strength 
The literature has also explored a relationship between union strength and the 
passage of RTW laws. In order to operationalize union strength, I will use the 
percentage of a state’s workforce who claim union membership. These estimates 
are provided by BLS. Given that unions draw much of their strength from their 
numbers, this measure should offer an accurate approximation of general union 
strength in a given state. 
 
Table 1: Introduction Summary Statistics of all Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Units Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
GOP Governorship Binary 196 0.63 0.49 0 1
Passage Binary 200 0.51 0.5 0 1
GOP Legislative Composition Percent 196 54.54 17.65 6.58 86.67
Bill Introduction Count 200 1.35 2.36 0 18
Small Business Composition Percent 100 97.04 1.1 92.9 99.19
Union Density Percent 150 10.42 5.21 1.85 24.5
Unemployment Percent 150 6.26 1.86 2.8 12.1
Black Population Composition Percent 150 10.85 9.47 0.75 37.82
Unemployment (Natural Log) Ln(Percent) 150 1.79 0.31 1.03 2.49
Union Density (Natural Log) Ln(Percent) 150 2.21 0.54 0.615 3.2
Black Population Composition (Natural Log) Ln(Percent) 150 1.94 1.03 -0.29 3.63
Change in Unemployment Fraction 150 -0.17 0.09 -0.39 0.8
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Table 2: Passage Summary Statistics of all Variables 
 
Control Variables 
Each model maintains different types of controls. In the introduction model, year- 
and region- fixed effects are applied across all models in order to capture unobserved 
characteristics across each state and year. Since these states and years vary significantly 
in different characteristics, fixed effects are suitable for inclusion in order to capture 
some of this variation. The inclusion of this effect also follows precedence from previous 
right-to-work analyses (Jacobs and Dixon 2006). Due to limited sample size and variation 
in the explanatory variables, I employ regional effects to account for variation between 
states. These regions conform to the regional system utilized by the U.S. Census, where 
the following four regions make up the United States: South, Midwest, Northeast, and 
West. These groupings compose the categorical, regional fixed effect variable. 
In addition, a binary variable titled “Historically Right-to-Work States” will be 
included to the introduction model, where states with a comprehensive right-to-work law 
prior to 1985 will be coded as “1” and the remaining states as “0.” We can assume that 
state legislatures passing RTW laws in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s may have been 
operating by different forces in the “modern” era, or, by this definition, post-1980. This 
Variable Units Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
GOP Governorship Binary 483 0.43 0.5 0 1
Passage Binary 483 0.02 0.14 0 1
GOP Legislative Composition Percent 483 42.8 14.38 5.5 75.4
Bill Introduction Count 104 2.06 2.82 0 18
Small Business Composition Percent 402 97.55 1.08 92.9 99.28
Union Density Percent 459 16.28 5.15 6 30.15
Unemployment Percent 459 5.89 1.8 2.35 13.15
Black Population Composition Percent 398 7.81 6.45 0.26 30.47
Unemployment (Natural Log) Ln(Percent) 459 1.73 0.3 0.85 2.58
Union Density (Natural Log) Ln(Percent) 459 2.73 0.33 1.79 3.41
Black Population Composition (Natural Log) Ln(Percent) 398 1.63 1.06 -1.35 3.42
Change in Unemployment Fraction 459 0.002 0.28 -0.39 1.01
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date cut-off is selected for a variety of reasons. First, data for various indicators becomes 
unavailable prior to the 1980s. Second, the cut-off for the modern RTW appears, 
according to Figure 1, to occur between 1970 and 1990. Third, the 1980s mark a major 
point of party realignment in American politics, and given the importance of partisanship 
within this analysis, it becomes critical to control for factors like party realignments. For 
instance, changes within the Republican Party after the election of Ronald Reagan may 
have created different party alignments and dynamics in state legislatures. Some 
historians view this point as a major realignment of Republican politics (Wilentz 2009). 
Moreover, this point marks the beginning of a Republican Party more focused on 
platform planks such as fiscal and social conservatism. Since the model aims to examine 
only the modern resurgence in right-to-work laws and not RTW laws passed before that 
point, it becomes necessary to isolate these states, while still including introduced right-
to-work legislation in historically right-to-work states. In the introduction model, this will 
serve as a control. In the passage model, due to the nature of a binary model, historical 
RTW states are eliminated from the regression altogether.  
Hypotheses: 
Based upon theories set forth in the literature, I offer five hypotheses to explain the 
introduction or passage of right-to-work legislation. The null hypothesis states that the 
introduction and/or passage of RTW legislation is due to random chance in a given state 
and year. For each respective hypothesis, I utilize a distinctive model to appropriately test 
for each theory’s viability and predictive power. They are as follows: 
H0, Null: The introduction and/or passage of modern right-to-work legislation 
occurs due to random chance. 
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Though unlikely, random chance forms the null hypothesis of this analysis. 
Despite no examination of modern RTW by previous literature, analyses of 
historical RTW indicate that several factors can play into the adoption of RTW 
laws. 
 
H1, Demographics: States with higher minority populations are less likely to 
introduce or pass modern right-to-work legislation. 
This hypothesis is based upon mixed evidence. While some studies have 
associated larger minority populations with more hostile laws intended to limit 
minority rights and privileges, others show that black workers favor collective 
bargaining rights and unions. 
 
H2, Partisanship: State legislatures under GOP control are more likely to 
introduce or pass modern right-to-work legislation. 
Anecdotal evidence indicates that modern RTW laws have been passed 
overwhelmingly by legislatures composed of a majority of Republican Party 
members. Furthermore, the modern Republican Party has often demonstrated 
hostility toward collective bargaining rights. Interestingly, studies have found that 
historical RTW law passage is not associated with GOP legislative composition 
(Jacobs and Dixon, 2006). 
 
H3, Enterprise Size: States with a greater proportion of small businesses are 
more likely to introduce or pass modern right-to-work legislation. 
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Evidence indicates that small business owners tend to support RTW laws. As a 
result, a state with a number of small businesses as a portion of all businesses will 
face stronger pressure to pass RTW laws. As a result, high relative numbers of 
small businesses will lead to a higher likelihood of passing RTW laws. 
 
H4, Joblessness: States with higher unemployment rates are less likely to 
introduce or pass modern right-to-work legislation. 
Previous research has shown an association between worsening economic 
conditions and increased protections of collective bargaining rights. However, on 
an intuitive level, the converse would also be reasonably predicted, as worsening 
employment conditions may create movement toward changes in labor market 
laws to generate perceived economic growth. 
 
H5, Union Strength: States with lower union density are more likely to introduce 
or pass modern right-to-work legislation. 
Unions have served as strong political influences throughout American history. 
Smaller union membership often means unions exhibit less influence, and as a 
result, legislation against union interests faces more likely implementation. In this 
case, union density is operationalized by statewide union membership. 
 
Model Specifications 
 For binary RTW passage, I will use a Cox regression model, a nonparametric 
survival model. Previous literature has relied on a variation of a logit or probit model. 
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The application of a probit model with fixed effects, however, presents a number of 
issues. First, lack of substantial variation in the response variable generates difficulties in 
estimating fixed effects for each state and each year. As a result, a fixed effect model will 
not reduce disturbance errors. Second, a probit model does not correct for endogeneity 
originating from years following a given state’s passage of a RTW work. Upon the 
passage of a RTW law, the response variable switches from “0” to “1,” and since no state 
has repealed a RTW law during this study’s timeframe, passage is coded as “1” 
thereafter. Given the model treats each year and state as a separate observation, the model 
assumes that a given state legislature reevaluates whether to pass a RTW law. Since 
previous literature indicates that RTW laws subsequently affect a state’s economic and 
political institutions, we can assume that passage of a RTW law alters the likelihood that 
RTW laws will be repealed. As a result, a probit model introduces an element of reverse 
causality and thus endogeneity. 
 In light of these issues, I utilize a survival model. This model calculates the effect 
of variables on hazard toward “death,” or movement of a response variable from “0” to 
“1,” during a given time interval. In this case, “death” would be the passage of a RTW 
law. This type of legislative action matches this characterization because no state within 
the given timeframe has successfully repealed a RTW law.10 In accordance with this 
assumption, I drop all observations following the passage of a RTW within a given state. 
This addresses the issue of endogeneity stemming from the effect of a RTW law on 
future repeal decisions discussed in the previous paragraph. In addition, in order to 
                                                     
10 Only two states, Delaware and New Hampshire, have successfully repealed a RTW law (1949) after 
passing the law two years prior. Due to these events occurring in a different time, it could not be 
incorporated in this analysis (Gall, 1988) 
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examine only recent adoptions of RTW laws, I drop all observations characterized as 
“Historically Right-to-Work,” which equates to dropping Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, 
Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, North 
Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, 
Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming from the analysis. 
 Types of survival models differ based upon two primary dimensions: 
discrete/continuous data and the shape of the hazard baseline. With regard to the former 
criteria, I characterize the RTW variable as continuous. While the presence of the RTW 
law is measured at discrete intervals, the adoption of a RTW law is a continuous process 
that could occur at any time within a given legislative period. With regard to the latter 
criteria, previous literature is both sparse and lacking of survival model usage. As a 
result, assuming a particular hazard baseline distribution (i.e. logistical, exponential, 
Weibull) would be inappropriate. Accordingly, the Cox regression model presents a key 
advantage, wherein no underlying hazard distribution is assumed and calculates a 
nonparametric baseline. 
 The Cox regression model includes the proportional hazards assumption, which 
assumes a constant relationship between time and the hazard (Cox, 1972). The data 
appears to violate this assumption due to the concentration of RTW passage during later 
time periods. Figures 2 and 3 display the Schoenfield test for GOP composition and 
union density, which present some indications of positive relationships with time. 
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Figure 3: Test of PH Assumption - GOP Composition 
 
Figure 4: Test of PH Assumption - Union Density 
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Fortunately, the Cox regression model allows for the slight relaxing of this 
assumption by specifying stratification within Stata. This specification serves as an 
adequate method of accounting for time effects, which have been addressed in previous 
literature, albeit through fixed or random effects. This method also avoids pitfalls 
resulting from lack of variation in the RTW binary variable. 
 In order to maximize consistency across groupings, I account for clustering 
between states. Given the adequate number of observations within each state, a 
parametric clustering specification seems appropriate. In order to account for differences 
between states, I include Huber/White/sandwich errors. As a result, we can interpret the 
resulting model as a consistent estimation across clusters. 
For count RTW introduction, I will use a Poisson distribution. In order to utilize 
the Poisson distribution, we must test whether the distribution of the response variable, 
bill introduction by state and year, conforms to the Poisson distribution. This can be 
examined by determining whether the response variable shows indications of over-
dispersion. The following table displays that result: 
 
Table 3: Summary Statistics of RTW Introduction 
 
 
 
The standard deviation is nearly double the value of the mean, indicating that RTW 
introduction is over-dispersed. I utilize a negative binomial distribution to correct for this 
assumption of the Poisson distribution. 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
RTW Introduction 200 1.345 2.357 0 18
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 Since legislative periods occur in two-year intervals, all variables will be coded 
according to two-year intervals. Two values across two years will be averaged. This 
applies to the following variables: unemployment, black population, union density, and 
small firm density. Coding variables by year rather than period would represent that state 
legislatures reevaluate each year whether to introduce and/or pass RTW legislation. In 
reality, this reevaluation more likely occurs after turnover from an election, and the 
legislative docket is reset. Most all states hold elections every two years for at least some 
members of their legislative assemblies. 
 RTW introduction will be measured from 2011 to 2017. Data unavailability 
prevents analysis of previous periods. Given that resurging passage begins in 2012, 
however, this period will suffice in measuring the introduction variable. The summary 
counts for each period are as follows: 
Table 4: Frequency of RTW Introduction Counts by Year 
 
 
Introduction Count 2011-2012 2013-2014 2015-2016 2017-2018
0 25 26 27 32
1 13 4 3 6
2 4 7 8 6
3 3 6 4 3
4 3 3 2 1
5 0 1 1 1
6 2 2 1 1
7 0 0 1 0
8 0 0 1 0
10 0 0 1 0
15 0 1 0 0
18 0 0 1 0
Total Count 54 80 93 42
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 RTW passage will be measured from 1981 to 2017. The justification for 
beginning the analysis in 1981 is the same as the above justification for the Historically 
RTW State control variable. Each period will be coded according to whether a 
comprehensive RTW law exists during that period in that state.  
 Both models divide theories into separate equations and offer a combined 
equation with all explanatory variables included. Assuming the introduction or passage of 
a RTW law occurs due to a complex combination of different factors, an equation that 
captured that dynamic would include multiple factors from different theories. While this 
multi-factored approach may operationalize determinants of RTW laws on a theoretical 
level, including multiple variables risks multicollinearity and an inability to differentiate 
effects from one another. This simultaneously separate and combined approach allows for 
the limiting of multicollinearity, while providing for a more complex model of RTW 
introduction and passage. 
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Chapter 4: Results 
Model 1: Introduction Results 
 Table 5 displays the results of the negative binomial distribution across different 
explanatory variables. Neither the percent of black population nor percent of Hispanic 
population hold statistical significance in predicting the introduction of RTW legislation 
in a given year and state. Neither GOP composition of the legislature nor the portion of 
small businesses in a given state hold statistical significance in predicting the introduction 
of RTW legislation in a given year and state. Unemployment does not hold statistical 
significance in predicting the introduction of RTW legislation in a given year and state. 
Union density does not hold statistical significance in predicting the introduction of RTW 
legislation in a given year and state. Of the tested theories, only presence of a GOP 
governor holds statistical significance in predicting the introduction of RTW legislation 
in a given year and state (only in the deconstructed regression), and it holds a negative 
relationship with bill introduction. 
 With regard to the presence of a GOP governor, the difference in the logs of 
expected counts between presence of a GOP governor and lack thereof would be 
expected to decrease by 0.55 units. In other words, the number of introductions will be 
over 50 percent greater under a non-GOP governor compared to a GOP governor. 
Furthermore, in 2011-2012, the predicted number of introductions is 0.002, and in 2013-
2014, the predicted number of introductions is 0.004. Statistically insignificant 
coefficients and standard errors are displayed in Table 5 below. Figure 6 also offers the 
negative binomial function for GOP legislative composition for both presence of a GOP 
governor and presence of a non-GOP governor. The magnitude appears to match that 
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estimated by the regression, where the difference between these lines of predicted counts 
appears approximately 0.5. In addition, the upward-sloping line offers evidence of a 
positive relationship between GOP legislative composition and RTW bill introduction. 
However, from the statistically insignificant regression output, the evidence needed to 
conclude that this occurs for reasons beyond random chance is not present. 
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Table 5: Bill Introduction by Theory11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
11 Due to the number of periods being reduced to two in the combined regression, the year fixed effect is 
excluded from this regression. 
Explanatory Variable
Demographics Partisanship Enterprise Size
% Black Population (natural log) -0.02 (0.17) - -
% Union Density (natural log) - - -
% Unemployment (natural log) - - -
% GOP Legislative Composition - 0.01 (0.01) -
Presence of GOP Governor - **-0.55(0.24) -
% Small Businesses - - 0.04 (0.17)
Constant 0.35 -0.14 -3.13
Observations 150 196 100
Log Likelihood -234.36 -209.52 -150.14
Chi Squared 0.65 **6.07 0.14
Joblessness Union Strength Combined
% Black Population (natural log) - - 0.08 (0.26)
% Union Density (natural log) - -0.21 (0.37) -0.04 (0.50)
% Unemployment (natural log) 0.21 (0.66) - -0.90 (0.90)
% GOP Legislative Composition - - 0.01 (0.01)
Presence of GOP Governor - - -0.23 (0.40)
% Small Businesses - - 0.10 (0.20)
Constant -0.14 0.83 -6.91
Observations 150 150 98
Log Likelihood -234.31 -234.2 -149.21
Chi Squared 0.01 1.68 2.11
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Theory
Bill Introduction by Theory
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Figure 5: Partisanship Poisson Regression from Predicted Counts 
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Model 2: Passage 
 Table 6 displays the results of the survival model across different explanatory 
variables. Unemployment does not hold statistical significance in predicting the passage 
of RTW legislation in a given year and state. The percentage of small businesses does not 
hold statistical significance in predicting the passage of RTW legislation in a given year 
and state. Percentage of black population may hold statistical significance, but since it 
only meets the most liberal threshold of statistical significance, the significance of 
relative black population in predicting the passage of RTW legislation is inconclusive. 
Two theories hold statistical significance. Partisanship holds, wherein GOP composition 
of the legislature hold statistical significance in predicting the passage of RTW legislation 
in a given year and state. Even though GOP governorship does not hold individual 
statistical significance, it, collectively with GOP composition, does hold statistical 
significance. In addition, union density holds statistical significance in predicting the 
passage of RTW legislation in a given year and state. Figures 7 and 8 display the hazard 
functions for GOP legislative composition and union density respectively in relation to 
time. 
 In terms of interpretation of the coefficient estimates, I examine the significant 
variables only. In regard to partisanship, a one percent unit increase in GOP composition 
in a given legislature is associated with a 1.101 percent increase in the hazard of RTW 
passage. In regard to union strength, a one percent decrease in union membership in a 
given state is associated with a 4.7 percent increase in the hazard of RTW passage. 
Important to note, however, is that these estimates do not predict the hazard of RTW 
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passage at every point in time. Rather, they occur at the mean levels of the explanatory 
variables of GOP composition and state union membership. 
 Figures 7 and 8 indicate how the hazard function behaves over time holding either 
GOP legislative composition or union density constant. With regard to both GOP 
legislative composition and union density, the increased hazard with time involves a 
small magnitude. While statistically significant, the actual effect sizes with time involve 
small, insignificant changes. This appears to occur due to the rarity of RTW passage 
(only seven in approximately 15 legislative periods across over 20 states). Union density 
hazard functions also have little difference in shape, meaning that, no matter the level of 
union density in a given state, the underlying hazard of RTW passage is similar across 
time. GOP legislative composition, however, rises drastically higher in a given time 
period for 66 percent GOP legislative composition than with 33 percent GOP legislative 
composition. This difference in hazard function indicates that, while the magnitude of the 
effect over time remains small, the difference in effect between GOP legislative 
composition levels is notably high. 
 To further explore the dynamic of GOP composition, I developed a more precise 
model attempting to account for “voting thresholds.” Moreover, passage may become 
substantially more significant after GOP legislative composition passes fifty and sixty-
seven percent respectively. In order to account for this, I employ interaction terms 
between indicator variables denoting these thresholds and GOP legislative composition. I 
also generate a model that accounts for an interaction between GOP governorship and 
legislative composition. However, both of these specifications do not show statistical 
significance. While they are jointly significant with other parts of the regression, their 
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significance cannot be untangled from that of GOP governorship and GOP legislative 
composition. The same result occurs with an interaction term created for GOP 
governorship and GOP legislative composition. As a result, the regression includes these 
as separate explanatory variables as part of the same theoretical model. 
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Table 6: Binary Passage by Theory12 13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
12 Small business composition is excluded due to an inability to calculate a Cox regression with all 
variables included. Due to the rarity of RTW passage in the population and the number of variables 
included, convergence is reached before maximum likelihood estimation can be performed. 
13 The values given for each theory are the hazard ratio and standard error. As a result, one by the other will 
not obtain z-scores. 
Explanatory Variable
Demographics Partisanship Enterprise Size
% Black Population (natural log) *1.70 (0.54) - -
% Union Density (natural log) - - -
% Unemployment (natural log) - - -
% Change in Unemployment - - -
% GOP Legislative Composition - ***1.10 (0.03) -
Presence of GOP Governor - 2.66 (1.79) -
% Small Businesses - - 1.78 (0.78)
Observations 398 483 402
Log Pseudolikelihood -19.3 -22.7 -12.9
Wald Chi Squared *2.78 ***11.32 1.71
Joblessness Union Strength Combined
% Black Population (natural log) - - *4.37 (3.45)
% Union Density (natural log) - ***0.05 (0.05) ***-0.01 (0.01)
% Unemployment (natural log) 8.81 (13.18) - *444.86 (1539.05)
% Change in Unemployment 3.01 (9.09) - 0.22 (0.65)
% GOP Legislative Composition - - ***1.09 (0.02)
Presence of GOP Governor - - 3.62 (5.16)
% Small Businesses - - -
Observations 459 459 398
Log Pseudolikelihood -22.58 -19.85 -11.43
Wald Chi Squared 2.92 ***7.24 ***62.37
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Binary Passage by Theory
Theory
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Figure 6: Partisanship Survivor and Hazard Functions for Cox Model 
 
Figure 7: Union Strength Survivor and Hazard Functions for Cox Model 
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Results Discussion 
 A number of notable observations can be identified from the results of these two 
estimated models. First, only one theory presented a statistically significant prediction of 
the introduction of RTW legislation: GOP governorship. Taken out of the context among 
the other tested theories, this result falls in line with some basic intuitions and previous 
research. GOP legislators generally support the passage of RTW laws. Introducing 
legislation to that effect would be one tool available to establish their position and 
attempt to pass a RTW law. Furthermore, even if passage of an introduced RTW bill 
were to be unlikely during a given session, introduction of RTW bills could serve as a 
valuable tool to some elected legislators. For example, if a given legislator sought to 
oppose the agenda of a sitting governor, introduction of RTW legislation could be a 
signaling device that indicates that legislator’s willingness to support their ideology 
and/or the interests of their constituents. If a non-GOP governor remains in power, more 
legislators would seek to demonstrate their support of RTW laws. In this sense, more 
introduced RTW bills would be expected from states with non-GOP governors. The 
estimated model ultimately supports this theory. 
 This reasoning, however, must be reconciled with the lack of statistical 
significance found among unemployment, GOP legislative control, small business 
composition, black percent of the population, and union membership. A number of 
reasons could explain this result. Unemployment, black percent of the population, and 
small business composition results may be explained as interests without sufficiently 
significant influence on the introduction of RTW bills. Legislators often attempt to 
represent a broad set of interests, and these interests may not be strongly connected to the 
Baehren 45 
 
introduction of RTW laws. Lack of statistical significance with GOP legislative 
composition may also be explained. First, sample size may be impeding a finding of 
statistical significance. 98 observations may not be sufficient to establish a pattern. 
Second, legislators may behave differently based upon the party of the governor versus 
party of the legislative majority. For instance, legislators may respond with clearly 
“protest” bills when faced with a governor of the opposite political party, while a less 
definitive response occurs with the presence of a GOP-dominated legislature.  
 The results of the analysis regarding recent RTW passage has several key 
implications. First, partisan factors have a more substantial effect on recent RTW 
adoption than do economic factors. Moreover, these laws do not appear to be adopted due 
to concerns regarding unemployment or small business density in a given state. Rather, 
RTW seems to be, primarily, a political issue and part of a conservative political agenda. 
Second, partisan factors have a more substantial effect on RTW adoption than do racial 
factors. RTW adoption does not seem to be driven by racial motivations. Third, union 
density appears to play a significant role in RTW passage. This conclusion is tentative. 
Since union density and GOP legislative composition are significantly negatively 
correlated with one another, union density may only be mirroring the variation 
exemplified by GOP legislative composition. It does, however, indicate that states with 
lower union density tend to adopt RTW laws, whether or not this association serves as a 
causal mechanism. 
 Regarding partisanship, some evidence indicates that RTW passage serves as a 
political strategy. A strong association exists between GOP legislative composition 
without a similar association found with employment factors. Moreover, several states 
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that have recently adopted RTW laws were battleground, or “swing,” states in both the 
2012 and 2016 U.S. elections.14 15 
Limitations  
This analysis, while valuable, contains several limitations that merit explanation. 
First, the influence of other states in a given state’s introduction or passage of RTW 
legislation remains unaddressed. The relevance of this to RTW law passage seems 
plausible, as modern RTW has occurred primarily in the Midwest and Great Lakes 
regions. In addition, historical RTW tended to occur in the West and South. While this 
may simply be evidence of similar characteristics among states in a given region, state-to-
state influence nonetheless remains plausible. 
 In addition, other variables operationalize the theories presented and could 
indicate other dimensions of determinants of RTW laws. For instance, labor market 
conditions could also be operationalized by wage levels or another variant of 
unemployment. The goal of this analysis, however, was not to explore these different 
measures, but, rather, use the standard measures suggested by the determinants literature 
and apply those measures to modern RTW laws. Certainly, however, further research 
would be welcome exploring these theories through other measures of labor market 
conditions. 
 
 
 
                                                     
14 Mahtesian, Charlie. “What are the swing states in 2016?” Politico. June 15, 2016. 
https://www.politico.com/blogs/swing-states-2016-election/2016/06/what-are-the-swing-states-in-2016-
list-224327 
15 “2012 Swing States.” Politico. 2012. https://www.politico.com/2012-election/swing-state/ 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
This thesis explores the complex dynamics involved in the introduction and 
passage of RTW legislation. Given the effects of RTW laws on the economic, social, and 
political dimensions of a given state, the importance of these dynamics cannot be 
understated. Previous studies have examined these dynamics through the lens of a 
number of theories. In order to add to that body of literature, I operationalize these 
theories into a number of explanatory variables and examine “modern” RTW 
introduction and passage. Through regression analyses, I have tested the validity of 
several theories attempting to explain the introduction and passage of RTW laws. In an 
additional departure from previous literature, I employ a survival model that estimates the 
effect of different factors on the hazard toward RTW passage.  
The results have been, while not necessarily surprising, clarifying, in that different 
theorized motivations for RTW passage have been examined and tested. The introduction 
of RTW bills may serve as a tool to oppose non-GOP governors within a state, regardless 
of whether these bills have any reasonable likelihood of becoming law. On the other 
hand, the passage of RTW laws likely serves as a political tool in order to undermine 
union interests and, presumably, other political groups that draw strength from union 
organizing and active memberships. While the passage of any bill is inherently 
“political,” the passage of RTW laws is not associated with particular employment or 
demographic conditions. Rather, passage is only associated with a political strategy to 
promote a conservative agenda rather than address adverse economic conditions. 
The implications of these findings are both timely and useful. Should other states 
continue to decline in union membership and/or become controlled by the GOP in their 
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state legislatures, these states likely face increased risk of becoming RTW states. 
Conversely, state legislatures that remain in control of Democratic legislators face lower 
risk of becoming RTW states. Furthermore, higher union density also lowers the risk of 
RTW passage. Unemployment rate, small business density, and black population do not 
offer these predictions, and given the results of this analysis, these factors should not be 
examined as predictors of RTW passage. 
Moreover, whether RTW laws represent an opportunity or a threat to the 
economic and political health of a given state, these factors are likely critical in 
determining a state’s future economic conditions and political landscape. Should the 
current resurgence continue, such an expectation would be even more salient. Further 
exploration into the determinants of RTW laws merits attentions by future research, 
especially with regard to assessing the risk of RTW passage in remaining states. The 
effects of more states passing RTW laws would be wide-reaching and likely alter the 
economic, social, and political characteristics therein. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 7: Variable Sources and Descriptions 
 
Variable Source Description Pre-Processing Type 
Response Variable         
RTW Passage 
National 
Conference of 
State 
Legislatures 
The signing into law of a 
comprehensive right-to-work 
law None Binary 
RTW Introduction 
National 
Conference of 
State 
Legislatures 
The number of introduced 
bills in a given state and 
legislative session None Count 
Explanatory Variable         
State   All 50 states None String 
Year   
1985 to 2017; some years 
excluded due to lack of 
availability None String 
GOP Legislative 
Composition 
National 
Conference of 
State 
Legislatures 
Percentage of legislative 
composition in a given period 
In order to align 
legislative sessions 
to the same years, 
some state 
legislatures are 
shifted by one year 
forward Continuous 
GOP Governorship 
National 
Conference of 
State 
Legislatures 
Presence of a GOP governor 
in a given period 
In order to align 
gubernatorial 
terms to the same 
years, some terms 
are shifted by 1-2 
years forward Binary 
Black Population 
Percentage 
Current 
Population 
Survey and U.S. 
Census Annual 
Estimates 
Black population as a 
percentage of whole state 
population in a given period 
Natural logarithm; 
years in the same 
period averaged Continuous 
Small Business 
Percentage 
Bureau of Labor 
Statistics and 
Small Business 
Administration 
Businesses under 500 
employees as a percentage of 
total businesses in a given 
period 
None; years in the 
same period 
averaged Continuous 
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Unemployment Rate 
Bureau of Labor 
Statistics 
Those unemployed seeking 
work as a percentage of the 
labor force 
Natural logarithm; 
years in the same 
period averaged Continuous 
Union Membership 
Bureau of Labor 
Statistics; Barry 
and Mcpherson 
(2003) 
Members of labor unions as a 
percentage of labor force 
Natural logarithm; 
years in the same 
period averaged Continuous 
Control Variable         
GDP 
Bureau of Labor 
Statistics Gross Domestic Product 
Years in the same 
period averaged Continuous 
State Fixed Effect N/A 
Calculated based upon 
variable None Continuous 
Year Fixed Effect N/A 
Calculated based upon 
variable None Continuous 
 
